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Abstract—Communication anonymity is a key requirement
for individuals under targeted surveillance. Practical anonymous
communications also require indistinguishability — an adversary
should be unable to distinguish between anonymised and non-
anonymised traffic for a given user. We propose Blindspot, a
design for high-latency anonymous communications that offers
indistinguishability and unobservability under a (qualified) global
active adversary. Blindspot creates anonymous routes between
sender-receiver pairs by subliminally encoding messages within
the pre-existing communication behaviour of users within a social
network. Specifically, the organic image sharing behaviour of
users. Thus channel bandwidth depends on the intensity of image
sharing behaviour of users along a route. A major challenge we
successfully overcome is that routing must be accomplished in the
face of significant restrictions — channel bandwidth is stochastic.
We show that conventional social network routing strategies do
not work. To solve this problem, we propose a novel routing
algorithm. We evaluate Blindspot using a real-world dataset. We
find that it delivers reasonable results for applications requiring
low-volume unobservable communication.
I. INTRODUCTION
Anonymous communication networks such as Tor and
JAP [15], [26] have, in a short period of time, revolutionised
communication security landscape on the Internet. These sys-
tems and others [11], [10] provide anonymous communica-
tions which can defend against traffic analysis attacks. Often,
an adversary will try to build a dossier of the most central
nodes, and attacking those on the top of the list. Traffic
analysis of inter-node communication offers basic tools to
collect necessary intelligence in order to plan an attack —
i.e an understanding of their communication traffic behaviour
— for instance, who they talk to, how often, and the frequency
and timing of communication (all of this is contained in
metadata, which is collected, and stored, by GCHQ as part
of Tempora).
This information is inferred from the traffic data at appropri-
ate vantage points on the Internet. A map of internet backbone
links shows obvious positions where large percentages of
internet traffic pass through. For example, a majority of the
traffic between the USA and Europe passes through Cornwall,
where GCHQ also happens to have an listening station at
Bude. According to the Snowden revelations, this station
captures all traffic passing over ten of these undersea cables
as part of the Tempora program. This justifies the need to
consider global active adversaries in our threat model.
In anonymous communication networks, anonymity is pro-
vided under the assumption that users solely communicate
via anonymous channels. This is unrealistic as widespread
adoption of anonymous communications is hindered by us-
ability problems (performance overheads) as well as lack of
awareness. Therefore, users of anonymous communication net-
works also have to communicate over conventional channels.
Thus the statistical characteristics of the anonymous channel
of a user must be equivalent to (or indistinguishable from)
non-anonymous communication channels. Indistinguishability
is the property that anonymous and non-anonymous communi-
cations are not differentiable by an adversary. Indeed, without
indistinguishability, anonymous communication networks have
a basic usability problem.
Current approaches to this challenge take two directions.
One line of work is on censorship resistance mechanisms.
These works [4], [25], [23], [35], [2] all introduce extra
communication endpoints (such as cloud file storage services)
into traffic, meaning that there is some form of distinguishable
behaviour to monitor. Approaches that make use of protocol-
mimicking (attempting to hide one type of traffic by making
it appear as another) [30], [40], [42] fall victim to incom-
plete emulation of the protocols that they are attempting to
mimic [21].
A second direction is the design of anonymous commu-
nication networks. The unlinkability property [32] alone is
inadequate for a number of reasons. First, as Danezis et al.
pointed out, it does not hide the volume of communications
and hence leaks enough information to a global adversary
who can compile an ordered list of targets [13]. Second, it
does not defend against traffic confirmation attacks [33], [9]
where an adversary injects traffic load patterns to determine
communicating end points. To combat these problems full
unobservability — passive attacker cannot distinguish whether
or not a user is communicating — is needed. Systems such
as Drac [10] provide unobservable anonymous communica-
tions. However, the attacker can still distinguish between
the following communicating states of a user: whether or
not ’unobservable’ anonymous channels are in use, so the
protection accorded is still short of what users need.
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A. Motivation
Without indistinguishability, the use of anonymous commu-
nications alone could incriminate a user simply by identifying
their use. The use of anonymous communication channels can
cause escalations such as a targeted intrusion attack on the
user or worse, trigger a physical attack on the individual.
Anonymity without company [14], can make identification of a
user of anonymous communications much easier. For example,
in 2013 a student at Harvard University sent an bomb threat
through email in order to get his imminent economics exam
cancelled [36]. The student used Tor to send an email via the
Guerrilla [28] disposable email service, assuming he would
be unidentifiable. The investigators simply compiled a list of
Tor users filtered by the timing of the threat to identify the
student.
B. Research problem
Credible defences against targeted surveillance attacks re-
quire both indistinguishability and unobservability. This places
significant restrictions on the statistical characteristics of user
traffic — the traffic shape should be independent of the
presence of anonymous communications.
To address these requirements, we propose Blindspot, an
anonymous communication network that leverages conven-
tional communication channels on social networks. Specifi-
cally, the image-exchange behaviour of users. In Blindspot,
nodes communicate by broadcasting messages to their neigh-
bours. Messages are steganographically embedded within an
image the user uploads. When uploaded by the communicating
(sender) node, the message carrying image is available to all
its neighbours. Each participating node checks for incoming
messages by monitoring images uploaded by its neighbours.
It provides indistinguishability by ensuring that the image
upload behaviour of participating users remains unchanged
and provides probabilistic unobservability through the use of
steganography.
To the best of our knowledge, Blindspot is the first system
to provide both properties. This may make it a useful building
block of some forms of anonymous communications, such as
announcing a meeting of a social club (corporate gathering,
undercover organisation, dissident organisation, or a protest
group).
Blindspot achieves these properties through the use of social
trust relationships within the routing process. Unlike previ-
ous proposals based on steganographic techniques [4], [25],
[23], [35], [2], which introduce additional communication
endpoints, Blindspot routes through the pre-existing social
network, thus exploiting trust relationships to secure routing.
We leverage this in four ways. First, all routing is through pre-
existing social fabric interconnecting nodes, therefore no new
communication endpoints are introduced. Second, it leverages
the diffusion properties of the social network to efficiently and
anonymously route to the destination. Third, Blindspot does
not alter statistical characteristics of conventional user traffic.
This is achieved by piggy-backing on existing image sharing
behaviour, no extra images are added nor are extra uploads
scheduled. Channel traffic characteristics, as observable to the
adversary, are not altered. So routing depends wholly on the
innate image sharing behaviour of the users. This is a non-
trivial challenge. Blindspot operates on a network topology
where channel bandwidth is severely constrained. And, the
latency is a function of stochastic user behaviour along the
entire route. Fourth, social networks can be used to detect
Sybil attacks [44], [45], [12], [29] by detecting a small cut
that separates honest and sybil groups. Blindspot benefits
from Sybil resistance properties of social network topologies.
Specifically, this restricts the power of adversaries that seek
to inject large numbers of misbehaving participants into the
network.
We evaluate Blindspot empirically using real-world social
network topologies and real user behaviour. From our evalua-
tion, we find that Blindspot is able to route 90% of messages
within a day across diverse routes. We also validate our work
on a synthetic social network topology.
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, in Section II
we will give a more formal definition of the problem. This
will be followed by an overview of the system design (Section
III), and then a full evaluation of the systems performance in
Section IV and discussion of the security provided by this
system in Section V. Finally, we will give an overview of
existing systems in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Blindspot’s goal is to offer high-latency anonymous commu-
nications with the following properties: (a) Indistinguishability
between (high latency) anonymised and non-anonymised com-
munications of a given user. (b) Unlinkable communication
between sender and receiver pairs. (c) Low-delay any-to-any
routing in a network with stochastic node behaviour.
In this situation low-delay is used in relative terms. The
system will not be able to achieve latencies that match that of
systems such as Tor, rather message delivery can be measured
in hours or even days. The low-delay property represents the
routing algorithm’s design that aims to reduce this delay as
much as possible.
A. Low-delay routing in a capacity constrained network
Consider a social network represented by a graph G =
(V,E), where nodes are people and edges are trust relation-
ships. Each node vi ∈ V in the graph is associated with
a probability distribution over time elapsed between images
posted by the corresponding user. The time between image
postings is the minimum amount of time that a message can
spend sitting on a node. This is called the delay distribution
of vi.
A route of length k on the network is a sequences of vertices
v1, v2, . . . , vk. A message sent along this route will be influ-
enced by the delay distribution of all the nodes along the route.
We assume that a node downloads all messages broadcast
by its neighbours whenever it uploads. This assumption is
based on the current operational behaviour of many OSNs
(which predicatively cache image posts from neighbours for
performance reasons).
The problem of routing in a network with weighted nodes,
where each weight is an independent random variable, is an
unsolved problem. Note, that graph weights are not generated
from a probability distribution function. Instead, each node
is associated with a separate PDF which is different (and
independent) of all other nodes in the graph.
B. Indistinguishability
In a nutshell, indistinguishability is defined as the inability
to distinguish between anonymous and non-anonymised traffic
traces of a specific user. Blindspot leverages photo exchange
traffic of users on social networks as the carrier channel.
We formally define the Indistinguishability Game (inspired by
Cryptography literature), played between the attacker and a
communicating user: First, consider photo upload traffic PX0
generated from a distribution over inter-upload delay times of
the user X , when the user is not communicating via Blindspot.
Next, consider the photo upload traffic PX1 when the user
is communicating via Blindspot. Now a random i ∈ 0, 1 is
generated by a fair coin flip, the defender is given one or more
click traffic sets from Pi and he/she outputs i′. The attacker
wins the game if i = i′. A communication channel is ‘indis-
tinguishable’, if no attacker can win the Indistinguishability
Game with probability non-negligibly greater than 0.5.
C. Threat model
The Blindspot system attempts to achieve its goals under
two types of adversaries. Firstly, the primary threat as consid-
ered by this system is the global active adversary. This refers
to the OSN provider (for example, Facebook), who we assume
has access to all images uploaded to the network and the full
underlying social graph. We also assume that the OSN has the
capability to modify images in any way that they see fit. The
OSN may be colluding (not necessarily knowingly) with an
external surveillance agency (for example the NSA or GCHQ).
Secondly, we consider the partially active insider. We as-
sume that the adversary can insert dishonest nodes, either
through the introduction of Sybil nodes or by compromising
existing users. These nodes can be used to monitor traffic
on the network, by collecting any images that pass over
them, and has access to the embedded data. The insider
can perform tagging attacks on the messages to attempt to
remove unlinkability, and can instruct insiders to perform DOS
attacks through blackholing (refusing to route messages), or
by flooding messages in order to disrupt routing. Blindspot
offers partial defences against a subset of active insider attacks,
but not all of them. A detailed discussion on the system’s
resistance and susceptibility to various attacks can be found
in Section V.
D. Intended Use
The system in its earliest form will only support the sending
of short, text based messages (around the length of a tweet),
including anything that can be encoded into this length of text
as hexadecimal or base64 strings. The message data could
undergo external compression in order to maximise capacity.
For data that is too long to send, multiple messages could be
sent provided the contents contain error coding (to mitigate
undelivered portions of the data), or the message could consist
of a pointer to the data at an external source (for example a
link to a file on a cloud storage service).
While short messages may not seem useful, in many cases it
is enough in order to communicate key points. For example, in
the case of a protest group organising a protest, the organiser
simply needs to send a time and location. A whistleblower only
needs to send the details of either a dropzone for documents
or a location to arrange a meet.
1) Closed Networks: The system supports the ability for
users of the system to create smaller, closed networks in
order to provide communication solely within a social group.
For certain users groups, being able to separate from general
traffic and tweak system parameters to suit the situation could
provide extra benefits. The use of many smaller, more closed
networks has the benefit that there is less risk of congestion
due to smaller user numbers, and better trust relationships
in order to resist insider attacks. This is discussed more in
section III.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN
The major component of the design of Blindspot is the
new probabilistic routing algorithm that is able to successfully
route within the confines of the image sharing behaviour on an
online social network. To the best of our knowledge, routing
across nodes who are communicating at natural rates is an
unresolved problem.
A. Basics
1) Message-secrecy key pair: Each participating node gen-
erates a public encryption key and a private decryption key
according to a public-key cryptosystem. A pair of communi-
cating nodes (sender and receiver) exchange public encryption
keys out-of-band. For example, receivers could publish public
keys on an external site or distribute in person in a similar
fashion to how PGP keys are distributed today.
2) Neighbourhood key pair: Each node also generates a
second encryption key-pair, called the neighbourhood key-pair.
The private encryption key is shared with all of the node’s
neighbours. This allows them to deliver intended messages
directly to the receiver, and stop forwarding the message any
further.
B. Routing design
At the core of Blindspot is fully decentralised routing
algorithm, based upon a pull–broadcast model. Messages
are routed between a sender and receiver without revealing
receiver identity to any intermediate node on the route, except
the last ‘exit’ node.
Each node on the social network maintains an input message
queue (new incoming messages) and an output message queue
(outgoing messages).
Nr Unique nonce to identify message
(KMr , P
M
r ) = (y = g
x, x) for x ∈U Zq . Message public-private encryption key-pair of receiver
(KNr , P
N
r ) Neighbourhood public-private encryption key-pair of receiver
m Communication message
Km Elgamal encryption of m under key K
K[m′] Re-encryption of encrypted message m′
[KNr Nr,K
M
r M ] Message structure
TABLE I: Terminology
1) Node Knowledge: We make the assumption that every
node on the network has a full knowledge of only those
nodes for which it is directly connected, i.e. their “friends”.
This knowledge includes the image upload behaviour of those
nodes, and their friend lists. This is the typical case for many
social networks. For example, on Facebook (by default) a user
can view all activity performed by a friend (posts are by default
visible to friends and friends of friends), and can, usually, see
the friends list of that friend. The exception to this is if the
friend has set extra privacy setting on their account, but this
is the small minority of users.
A node has no knowledge of the global network topology,
only the 2-hop neighbourhood of which it is the centre node
(the node, its friends and its friends’ friends). Outside of this
2-hop neighbourhood, the node has zero knowledge of the
graph topology or the location and behaviour of other nodes.
Each node only has the ability to communicate with (share
images with and pull images from) its direct neighbours.
2) Message construction: Each message is of the form
KNr Nr,K
M
r M . To create a new message, the sender encrypts
the message with the receiver’s message-secrecy public key.
This ensure message privacy as only the receiver can recover
the actual contents of a message. Next, it generates a unique
nonce Nr. It then encrypts the the nonce to provide a function
for nodes in the receiver’s neighbourhood to discard dupli-
cates, and for the receiver to recognise duplicate messages.
The receiver’s address (this will vary according to the social
network, but will typically be the username) is encrypted
with the receiver’s neighbourhood key under the Elgamal-
based scheme described in section III-B7 using the receiver’s
neighbourhood public key.
The user agent running on the node now places a newly
constructed message and encrypted destination address into
the node’s output message queue.
Each node on the path therefore only sees the encrypted
destination and message. Each node, due to the use of re-
encryption, will see a different ciphertext for each component,
providing unlinkability and resistance to tagging attacks. An
important point is that different paths that a message takes
result in a different series of ciphertexts. The nodes who
possess the receiver’s neighbourhood key will be able to
identify the destination of messages for them, but will be
unable to view the message contents.
3) Output queue processing: To process messages on the
output queue, the user-agent waits for the user to upload an
image. Note: the same image is not used for each upload. The
image selection and uploading is carried out by a human, not
the user-agent. The state of the message queue has no impact
on the user’s decision to post an image.
Once the user selects an image, the user-agent intercepts
it and steganographically embeds messages into the image.
The precise method of doing this in a reliable manner without
interference from OSN compression algorithms is given in
Section III-B8 - “Channel design for unobservability”.
4) Input queue processing and routing strategy: Similarly,
when the user reads an image post, as part of their normal
browsing behaviour, the image is downloaded to the user’s
computing device. The user-agent then extracts embedded
message within the image and enters them into the input
queue. Blindspot then selects a subset of messages from the
input queue which are moved to the output queue according
to a routing strategy.
Traditionally, the path that is taken between two endpoints is
usually taken to be the shortest between them in the number of
hops or distance, which is the assumption that many traditional
routing and path selection algorithms work to. In this situation,
however, the shortest path in terms of hops may not necessarily
be usable if not all of the nodes on the path are active (or
frequent) uploaders. The state of the network in terms of which
nodes are “active” also changes often, meaning traditional
shortest path algorithms are insufficient (again, these usually
work on the assumption that nodes are static in behaviour).
We therefore use the inter-upload distributions for each
node to aid in the routing decisions, such that the chosen
paths represent the lowest waiting time (time between message
upload and subsequent upload by neighbour) resulting in a
relatively low delay path.
The upload delay distribution of each node is governed by a
random variable. Subsequently, the distribution over delivery
times, or the message-delay distribution is dependent on this.
For any given route, the message-delay distribution is the sum
of independent random variables (of nodes) on that route. For a
two hop route (s, t, r) where s (sender) is communicating with
r (receiver) via t (intermediary), the message delay distribution
is given by D = S + T, where S and T are random variables
whose PDFs are the inter-upload delay distributions of nodes
s and t respectively.
The sum of two random variables is equivalent to the
convolution of the respective PDFs, given by the convolution
formula:
(f ∗ g)(t)=
∫ ∞
−∞
f(τ) g(t− τ) dτ (1)
By applying this formula to every pair of node on the path,
the result will be the distribution of the possible total delay
of the message. In our system, however, it is not possible to
compute this full convolution as part of the routing algorithm
as the convolution output (which increases in size by the length
of the additional distribution at each convolution) will reveal
the number of hops the message has taken if it is passed along
with the message (it will also use up a large chunk of capacity).
An example convolution output can be found in Figure 1(b).
To solve this problem, we instead use the local knowledge
of nodes in order to compute the convolution a small section of
each path, without passing any values along with the message.
As we have said, each node knows the image upload
distributions of its neighbours (plus itself). This is enough
knowledge to compute a two hop section the path (the previous
node, the current node, and the next node). For a node with
degree d, this equates to d ∗ (d − 1) possible paths (from all
neighbours to all neighbours excluding the source).
a) Path selection: A node cannot pull every message that
is sees due to the capacity limitations. Therefore nodes need to
make some decision on which messages to pull and forward.
We use a probabilistic approach for deciding this.
During an upload session (the time period in which the user
is making uploads, where 1 or more images will be uploaded)
the node will fetch the messages contained in the last 5 uploads
made by each neighbour (limited by a TTL) that they have not
already processed. Note that uploads can be fetched over time
during normal browsing behaviour and the messages contained
cached. This means that messages can be processed in the
background over time, including the more costly operations
such as decryption and re-encryption. It also means that there
is not a sudden spike in requests for neighbours images, which
could be an indication of the systems use. The messages
from all of these uploads is placed in a queue, which is then
sorted according to a score function, given by eq. 2, where
similarityprev is the percentage of neighbours shared by the
current node and the neighbour the messages was received
from (the lower this value the better as it allows the message
to escape communities), and min(cdf)src is the minimum
convolution score for all possible exit routes (all neighbours
excluding the node from which the message was received)
(see section (III-B5) below, “Convolution Comparison”) nor-
malised between 0 and 100, which indicates the future upload
prospects of the message, a lower score indicating the greater
likelihood of delivery.
The score of message i is given by:
scoremi = similarityprev +min(cdf)src (2)
b) Message expiration: The messages are sorted in as-
cending order according to this score (eq. 2, lower scores
are desirable). The node will then go down this list, and
perform a weighted coin toss for each message to decide if it
should be pulled — moved from the input queue to the output
queue. Each message is selected with a probability 1/degsrc,
or discarded with probability 1 − 1/degsrc, meaning that the
lower the degree of the proceeding node, the more likely the
message is to be forwarded. Over time this provides an natural
expiration effect, message sprays will thin as time passes.
5) Convolution Comparison: We take the convolutions of
the previous node, the current node, and each possible next
node (resulting in the degcurrentnode − 1 distributions). Each
of these are then converted into a cumulative density function
(CDF), and a score is computed for each. The score measures
the steepness of the CDF at all points along it, such that a
lower score represents a CDF that climbs (and reaches 1) early.
The score is as follows:
length(cdf)∑
i=1
(1− Pi) ·Xi (3)
where Pi is the CDF value at position i, Xi is the X axis value
at position i and length(cdf) is the number of values along
the X axis. We take 1− Pi to reward CDFs that climb early,
as a CDF that reaches 1 sooner will have more of its values
multiplied by zero, resulting in a lower score.
A CDF with a lower score represents a PDF that is centred
over a low delay, meaning that the path segment represented
by it will likely have a low delay associated with it. Three
example CDFs and their associated scores can be seen in
figure 1.
The score will be larger for longer CDFs. If two CDFs of
different lengths need to be compared, the shorter CDF must
be extended with the addition of ones to the CDF values (or
zeros to the underlying PDF values) to make them of equal
length.
6) Sybil Protection: Blindspot does not propose a new
Sybil protection mechanism, but enjoys the benefits of existing
techniques proposed in this space [44], [12], [45], [29].
7) Tagging attack resistance and unlinkability: To ensure
that the input and output messages from each node are
bitwise unlinkable and hence resistant to tagging attacks, we
make use of universal re-encryption. As proposed by Golle
et al [19], universal re-encryption is a scheme that makes
use of the ElGamal asymmetric key encryption algorithm
to re-encrypt a message without the knowledge of recipient
public keys. This is summarised as follows:
Encryption of m using key K: Km : C =
[(α0, β0); (α1, β1)] = [(my
k0 , gk0); (yk1 , gk1)] where
k0, k1 ∈U Zq and q is a global system parameter, which is
1024 bits in size.
Decryption of a given ciphertext: K−1(α0, β0); (α1, β1) :
m0 = α0/β
x
0 m1 = α1/β
x
1 . If m1 = 1 then the plaintext is
m = m0.
Re-encryption: C ′ = [(α′0, β
′
0); (α
′
1, β1)
′] =
[(α0α
k′0
1 , β0β
k′0
1 ); (α
k′1
1 , β
k′1
1 )], where k
′
0, k
′
1 ∈U Zq
At each point along the path a message takes, the forwarding
node performs re-encryption on both ciphertexts. Any node
on the path can perform this step with no knowledge of
the receivers public key or the path that the message has
taken/will take. Note that the receiver address and message
are re-encrypted individually.
The use of re-encryption provides sender-receiver unlinka-
bility along all paths that the message takes, with no extra key
(a) Top score 398.1211, middle 94056.63 and bottom 226694.9
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(b) CDF of convolution of PDFs in (a). Score is 618401.3
Fig. 1: Score output for the CDF of three inter-upload PDFs and convolution output
setup apart from the initial receiver’s public key distribution.
This is more appropriate in this setting than the traditional
onion routing approach, whereas the public keys for nodes on
the path need to be collected by the source. Even if the path
was known to the source, the key set-up stage would take far
too long if key negotiation occurs within the system.
8) Channel design for unobservability: There are two main
requirements for the steganography algorithm used. First,
and most importantly, the algorithm should be statistically
undetectable [5], which means that no statistical test can
distinguish between the set of cover objects and the set of stego
objects. Secondly, in order to maximise the bandwidth within
the system the algorithm also needs to ensure as much capacity
is available as possible while maintaining data integrity in the
face of compression.
The system only requires that a group of users (such as
one social group) agree on one steganographic scheme to use,
which provides the trade-off between capacity and security
to meet their needs. For particularly sensitive information,
using an scheme which provides good security guarantees but
a lower capacity will be preferable. For more general users,
an higher capacity but lower security scheme could be used.
An suitable example is the YASS (Yet Another Steganogra-
phy Scheme) algorithm for JPEG steganography [37]. YASS
is an example of minimal distortion embedding [17] [27].
Schemes that employ minimal distortion embedding focus on
increasing the embedding efficiency by decreasing the embed-
ding distortion. The YASS algorithm requires two parameters.
Q represents the quality factor and dictates the amount of
compression performed by YASS, and q denotes the amount
of redundancy provided by the algorithm. The higher the value
of q the less data can be inserted into an image, but the
more resilient the steganography to error. By default to provide
unobservability YASS hides data at a rate of 0.05 bits per non-
zero DCT coefficient. Nagaraja et al [31] demonstrated the
ability of YASS to withstand uploading to and downloading
from Facebook. They found that, assuming a 720px image
and a q value of 2, 40280 bits of information could be hidden
(when tested on 116 different images). At the other extreme,
with a q value of 20, 4028 bits can be embedded. A sensible
choice of q = 4 results in 20140 bits of embedding capacity.
The YASS algorithm also achieves a low bit error rate (BER,
the ration of error message bits to the total number of bits
hidden). Using a quality factor of Q = 65 and redundancy
parameter of q = 4 results in an average BER rate of 0.1320.
The can be reduced to 0.0003 with parameters Q = 65 and
q = 20. These figures can be improved as some images are
inherently “bad” (result in a high BER), by not making use
of these images performance can be improved.
Fridrich et al [18] showed that both the MM3 [27] and
PQt [17] algorithms are also statistically undetectable at an
embedding rate of 0.05 bits per non–zero DCT coefficient.
Facebook currently supports images of a maximum size of
2048px (2048*2048) [46]. Flickr also supports images of this
size. This increase in image size is of a great benefit to image
steganography as the larger an image is the more data can be
hidden within it, we have estimated that this increase in size
can provide up to 8 times more capacity in an uploaded image
than as tested by Nagaraja et al. This gives a effective capacity
of 8-10kb (assuming YASS with q = 4.
a) Steganographic Keys: Each smaller network within
the Blind system will be responsible for deciding upon which
steganography algorithm is used. All members of the group
can be expected to use the same algorithm. Each user will also
have to generate an key which the will use when embedding
the data. This will need to be given to neighbours, and can
be shared along with the neighbourhood keys as described
previously. Allowing each user to choose their own key will
provide an extra level of security and prevent an insider leaking
the key to extract the embedded data across all images. If a
key is leaked, it will only affect the images of a single user,
and can be replaced.
C. Global and local networks
As we have mentioned, as the system is fully decentralised
it supports the creation of individual instances of the system.
Within each instance, users will have to set up keys and decide
upon a steganography algorithm. The main benefit of allowing
these smaller networks is that it strengthens the trust model
within the system. If the system is closed to users within
a single social group, it makes it far more difficult for an
unknown user to participate (as in a Sybil attack) and fewer
users reduces the likelihood of user compromise due to fewer
targets.
IV. RESULTS
To test the effectiveness of the routing algorithm we have
produced a simple simulation in the Java language. Two main
experiments are performed over two different networks. First,
we test the performance of the routing algorithm under increas-
ing congestion. We then test the effectiveness of the algorithm
to maintain performance in the face of an active attack, namely
the removal of increasing percentages of random and then high
degree nodes (an effective black-holing attack).
The simulator takes as input a graph and the individual
upload behaviour of each node. We then choose pairs of nodes
to communicate, such that a source sends to a destination. The
simulator works in a scale of days, with monthly image upload
counts for each node split evenly amongst 30 days, for a total
of 64 months. Each pair of nodes exchange 1 message per
month. To keep the simulator lightweight, we do not apply
encryption. After initial experimentation, we set the message
TTL to 15 days. As per our channel design, assuming uploaded
images are 4096px in size, we allow for 150 messages per
image upload. We choose an image size of 4096px as it is
(unofficially) accepted by Facebook for image uploads, and
most modern smartphones feature a camera capable of taking
images of this quality (or greater).
A. Test Data
The primary dataset that we use is the Flickr dataset from
Nagaraja et al [31]. This dataset contains the social graph and
monthly image upload behaviour of 7200 users of the Flickr
social network. We use this dataset as it is increasingly difficult
to apply crawling to social networks such as Facebook that
include strict privacy settings and Twitter which has restricted
the sharing of tweet data. The difficulty with sites such as
Facebook is that, increasingly, profiles are set to private for
everyone other than the friends of that person. While this
would not impact on the systems ability to function, it prevents
automated crawling of the social network. To calculate the
inter-upload time for each node, we divide each monthly value
by 720, which gives the estimated inter-upload time in hours.
To test the performance of the algorithm on a differently
structured network, we also use a network generated using
the Barabasi-Albert (BA) model [3], with a parameter of 5.
The Barabasi-Albert model produces a scale free network. We
generate a network of 7200 nodes and apply the Flickr upload
counts to this in a 1:1 mapping. We apply the 1:1 mapping as
the resulting correlation between degree and upload count is
very similar to that of Flickr.
B. Effects of Congestion
In a capacity restricted network it is important to measure
the effects of congestion. To measure the effects of congestion,
we choose increasing number of pairs of nodes to communi-
cates with 1 message per month per pair. The results of this
experiment are presented in Figure 2(a).
As can be seen in the figure, even under a high level of
congestion, the algorithm achieves a delivery rate of over 85%
in both of the test networks. Both networks exhibit a similar
degree of degradation under the increasing load. Interestingly,
in the Flickr dataset 10 pairs of nodes performed worst that
50 pairs. We believe that this is down to one of these 10 pairs
of nodes not having a stable path between them.
In both networks, the average delay for received messages
is 1 day. This remains constant as the load increases. What
does decrease, however, is the number of duplicate copies
of a message that the destination receives. In Flickr for 100
pairs each destination receives on average 27 copies of each
message. For 1000 pairs, this reduces to 10. In the BA model
network, the number of duplicates reduces from 7.1 to 2.7.
C. Effects of Black-holing
A possible active attack against this system is for nodes
in the system to be removed (either by the social network or
insiders). The node does not have to be physically removed
from the system, rather they can simply stop participating
in the routing protocol. It will take some time for the delay
distributions held by neighbours for that node to reflect this
change in behaviour, meaning the pull decision, which may
include the convolution of the removed node, could be made
assuming a neighbour is active when it is not. This will have
greatest affect when the node is a key link for many nodes.
The goal of this attack is to perform a denial-of-service by
breaking the paths between nodes.
We test the impact of this attack by removing an increasing
percentage of nodes from the network half way through the
routing simulation. By removing the nodes from the graph,
this has the same effect as the nodes no longer participating
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Fig. 2: Performance under congestion and attack
(due to the pull model). We use two strategies for removing
nodes, choosing nodes at random, and choosing high degree
nodes. We use high degree nodes as even though their is
little correlation between upload behaviour and the degree of
nodes, high degree nodes are still important for routing as
they statistically will view more messages than others. High
degree nodes are also likely to be the main connection to the
rest of the network for some nodes, meaning their removal
may prevent other nodes from communicating.
We use 100 pairs of nodes each communicating 1 message
per month. We do not remove nodes that are in one of these
pairs. The results of this experiment are shown in Figure 2(b).
As can be seen in the figure, in the face of the random
removal of nodes, both networks are very resilient to even 50%
of the nodes being removed from the system, losing only 2-
3% of the delivery rate. The exception is for 40% of the Flick
network being removed, this has a slightly larger effect. We
believe that this is due to the randomness – the 40% of nodes
chosen in that test contained a larger percentage of nodes that
were key to routing between the chosen pairs (the pairs were
kept constant across all test but the nodes to remove were
randomised for every test).
Removing high degree nodes proved to be the most effective
approach at causing a reduction in network performance, with
both networks showing a drop down to 52% and 56% delivery
rate when the 50% highest degree nodes were removed. This is
expected, as we have mentioned the high degree nodes, while
not necessarily being high uploaders, are still important in the
network for providing a connection point to many nodes. This
effect is visible in the sparser Barabasi network; the delivery
rate drops at a higher rate before levelling out due to more
nodes being disconnected from the network completely.
In both networks, and for both tests, the delay remains
unchanged at ˜1 day per message (that was delivered). The
main noticeable effect, other than the reduction in delivery
rate, is the reduction in the number of duplicate messages
received by the destination, as much as 15%. As we have
already shown there is enough duplication, however, that we
can tolerate the random node removal, and the messages that
do arrive with the high degree nodes removed still arrive
quickly.
D. Path Consistency
It is important that the paths taken by messages between
pairs of nodes maintain their quality over time. We measure
the quality of a path using the CDF score as defined in equa-
tion (3), applied on the convolution of all nodes’ distributions
on the path. We compute the score for the first path that
results in each message being delivered during the simulation
(maximum 64 per pair of nodes). Due to the differing lengths
of paths, we extend each path CDF such that all CDFs are of
an equal length (by adding 1s). We then compute the Shannon
entropy (H(X) = −∑i P (xi) logb P (xi)) of these scores for
each pair of nodes, and produce a distribution of these values.
Figure 3 provides the score distributions of the pairs with the
lowest and highest entropy, and the distribution of entropies
across all pairs.
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Fig. 3: Consistency of path quality
Figure 3(c) shows that a majority of the pairs have an
entropy of scores of approximately 0.3. This is a relatively
low entropy value, meaning that, over time, the quality of the
path does not exhibit much variation. This is indicative of the
same paths being used repeatedly if they are available (all
nodes uploading).
V. ANALYSIS
The primary goal of our system is to achieve indistinguisha-
bility. We also set out to provide a system that is resilient
against certain insider attacks.
A. Attacks on Communication Channel
The system as described does not create any extra traffic,
or introduce any new communication endpoints — this is the
basis for indistinguishability in our system. All communication
is achieved using the user behaviour that already “exists” (the
user would still upload images without the hidden channel).
Traditional traffic classification methods would not be able to
detect unusual behaviour. In addition, the use of good-listing
or bad-listing would be ineffective. In countries where internet
censorship does not occur, access to social networks is open.
In places where social network access is not permitted, there is
often a local, closed social network that is in use. The system
can easily be transferred amongst social networks.
1) Attacks on Routing: We have shown that, under targeted
attacks where insiders are able to remove the top 50% highest
degree nodes, the delivery rate can still maintain a level above
50%, with no noticeable impact on latency. Under random
attacks – nodes are attacked at random — the effect is a
reduction in delivery rate of just a few percent. This is due to
the large amount of disjoint paths taken by messages, unless
every path is disrupted, delivery can still occur.
2) Denial of Service Attacks: Following our threat model,
we assume that the OSN would be able to perform Denial-of-
Service attacks on the system by destroying the steganograph-
ically hidden information. This could be done, for example, by
applying heavy compression on an image (that even compres-
sion resistant steganography algorithms cannot survive) or by
applying a transformation to the image in order to invalidate
any hidden data. Facebook, for example, already applies heavy
compression to all uploaded images. Any further compression
will have a visible impact on image quality, as would any
image transformations. Obviously, a country can completely
block access to the social network itself. This is similar to
the issue of a censor blocking access to mixes and relays in
anonymous communication networks.
Unfortunately there is very little that can be done to
avoid DOS attacks. The redundancy provided by the routing
algorithm helps to prevent local DOS attacks, or in the
situation where the adversary only tampers with a subset of
images at random. Past this, it is important to make use of a
steganography algorithm that provides compression resistance
which will prevent the attacker from simply re-compressing
images.
3) Attacks on Steganography: The major risk to the unob-
servability provided by the system is that of steganalysis.
For a person that is already under targeted surveillance,
steganalysis could be applied to all images uploaded by that
person and their neighbours in an attempt to identify if they
are taking part.
The fact that all image payloads are encrypted will hin-
der steganalysis attempts. Assuming that steganalysis can be
applied, the attacker will also have to reliably identify cipher-
texts within the image and differentiate them from random
data. This will prove difficult if they do not know the cipher-
texts that are being sought. Further to this, using keyed
steganography algorithms with individual keys will also hinder
steganalysis attempts.
As mentioned in section III-B8, there are steganography
algorithms that are considered statistically undetectable when
used with small payloads. A common mistake when using
steganography is the use of large payloads which (a) makes
traffic analysis on the images possible and (b) renders the
channel vulnerable to compression-based attacks. We have
avoided both of these issues in our design.
If a user of the social network is found to be using
the system, unlinkability and message confidentiality will be
maintained, meaning the user will be reduced to the security
level provided by previous anonymity systems such as Tor.
B. Resistance to Insider Attacks
Our design ensures sender-receiver unlinkability [32] in
multiple cases. First, a single compromised node does little
damage: there is no sender address included with message
blocks, so an attacker node has no knowledge of the source.
As the destination address is encrypted (and subsequently
universally re-encrypted) with the neighbourhood key of the
destination only nodes with the private neighbourhood key of
the destination know where it is going. Second, the use of re-
encryption at each node along the route offers traffic analysis
resistance against passive colluding attackers by ensuring bit-
wise unlinkability between incoming and outgoing message
blocks. Finally, resistance against active collusion including
replay attacks and tagging attacks is ensured (during re-
encryption) by raising input ciphertexts to a random number
from Zq. Due to this operation, replayed message blocks will
not result in identical output message blocks. Similarly, any
changes (tagging) to an input block will be blinded during
re-encryption, hence tagged inputs will not be recognisable at
the output. The inherent protection provided by making use of
a social network against Sybil attacks also increases the effort
required by an attacker to inject malicious nodes in the first
place.
C. Design Limitations
1) Ciphertext lengths: There is a major downside to using
universal re-encryption, in that for every k bits of data, 4k
bits of ciphertext are required to be transmitted. However,
this is justified given the high risk of insider attacks. Despite
these overheads, Blindspot remains a usable system for low-
bandwidth anonymous communications where indistinguisha-
bility is required to avoid censorship.
2) Insider key leakage: The requirement of neighbours
being able to identify messages destined to neighbours opens
the system to a form of insider attack. If a neighbour of
a node is compromised, they can leak the decryption key
which will enable any node also under the attacker control to
identify messages destined for that destination. The message
contents, however, are not at risk (as only the recipient has
the decryption key).
Making use of key-based steganography goes some way in
alleviating this problem. If the steganography is open (meaning
no key or a global key is used) the global adversary would
be able to capture all images, extract all of the embedded
data and decrypt destination addresses. If individual keys are
used for steganography which are only shared with neighbours,
only other insiders will be able to identify messages as the
messages will only be hidden using that key at the node for
which they are uploaded. At other points in the path a different
steganographic key would be used meaning that the embedded
messages are not retrievable.
3) Out-of-band key distribution: Currently, the system re-
quires a large amount of out-of-band key distribution. As
the system is fully decentralised, low bandwidth and high
latency standard key distribution protocols are not optimal.
This problem could in part be solved through the use of
identity-based cryptography, although this introduces the need
for a key escrow which introduces a communication endpoint.
VI. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Unobservable Communications
There have been many attempts at providing unobservable
communication on the internet. One common approach is to
use steganography in tandem with web-based storage systems
to provide methods of communication. Unfortunately, none of
these techniques provide anonymity and indistinguishability
and hence are of little use in our threat context.
CovertFS [1] is a prototype system for providing a covert
file store that stores data (and file structure) in images stored
on photo sharing sites. The data can be shared amongst users
of the system, with a goal of achieving plausible deniability -
i.e. a user can deny that they are using the system (which is
reliant on the resistance of the steganography algorithm used
to steganalysis).
Collage [4] is another system that follows a similar ap-
proach. In Collage, data is hidden within media which is
uploaded to a user-generated content host. The receiving party
then accesses the media by performing some task (such as
accessing a URL or searching for specific terms), downloads
it and extracts the hidden data. The key point is that the content
host is interchangeable – i.e. if one service is blocked another
can be used with minimal effort. This is all in full view of the
censor, who sees only the transfer of the media file from the
uploader to the media server (a legal operation in most states),
and the download/access of the file by the receiver (again, a
legal, innocent operation in most cases). The censor is assumed
to have the ability to collect full traffic information on a target,
and disrupt communications. An extension to the system is
proposed by Invernizzi et al. [25], in which data is hidden
within images on blog posts. The system is different however,
as it allows for any blog to be used on any provider, meaning
that there are no single entry points (e.g. Flickr or Facebook)
to block. The rendezvous point is found using a search engine.
The deniability arises from the fact that every minute hundreds
of thousands of images are uploaded in blog posts, and so it
is infeasible for the censor to either run steganalysis on every
image, or block every blog provider.
Collage does not work under our threat model. Under tar-
geted surveillance, the attacker can easily isolate Collage com-
munications and break the user’s anonymity. This down to the
fact that collage introduces new endpoints into communication
(the source and receiver(s) connecting to the intermediary),
which will appear in traffic logs (including GCHQ collected
Tempora data) and may differ from normal behaviour.
The above systems are high-latency systems designed for
one-off transmissions of data. There are also systems that use
steganography for lower-latency communications. For exam-
ple, Huang et al. [23] propose a system for transmitting data by
hiding information within VoIP packets. Craig Rowland [35]
presents a number of methods for embedding data within
TCP/IP packet headers by modifying particular fields (those
that are optional, unused and are unlikely to be changed
in transit). Ahsan and Kundar [2] also hide data within the
headers of TCP/IP packets, but also propose a second method
of data hiding by changing the ordering of packets. This can
achieve a bandwidth log(n!) bits (where n is the number of
packets, for example 25 packets provides around 87 bits of
capacity). This method could be discovered, however, if all
packets consistently arrive (or are sent) out of order using
simple traffic analysis. Modified TCP/IP headers are also
trivial to detect if the header fields contain non standard
(default) values.
An alternative to steganography is protocol mimicking,
in which attempts are made to make one traffic protocol
appear as another. Due to its high detectability rate but high
usage rates, Tor is often the subject of work to try and
make it less detectable. For example, StegoTorus [42] and
SkypeMorph [30] both attempt to hide Tor traffic by making
it appear as VoIP (in particular Skype) traffic. The systems
attempt to produce protocols that can carry Tor traffic, but
exhibit the characteristics of the Skype protocol, including
timing and packet headers. CensorSpoofer [40] is designed
for obfuscated web browsing by decoupling the upstream and
downstream channels of a HTTP session. HTTP requests are
sent to the server over a low capacity channel such as email
or instant messaging, and the server responds to the client
mimicking UDP-based VoIP traffic, by emulating the traffic
from a dummy P2P host, more specifically SIP-based VoIP.
All three of these systems have been proven broken [21],
specifically because they are unable to fully emulate the
protocols they mimic, meaning that their usage can be detected
by looking for unusual behaviour (for example incorrect error
handling or malformed headers).
Houmansadr et al. [22] propose Freewave, a system for
converting IP traffic into VoIP traffic for circumventing internet
censorship. IP packets are converted into acoustic signals,
which are then transmitted to a Freewave server, which
converts the VoIP stream back into IP packets and releases
them into the uncensored internet, acting as a proxy. The
system uses encryption to make sure that the Freewave VoIP
packets are indistinguishable from from background packets.
Due to the use of Skype supernodes in routing, the source is
unlinkable from the server, so even if the censor knows the
servers identity, they will not automatically know the identities
of end users. The VoIP operator, however, may know who
communicates with the Freewave server, so it is assumed that
a provider who does not collude with the censor is used (a
weak assumption). The authors state that the system is resilient
to traffic analysis as the calls follow the same traffic patterns
as a normal VoIP call, but there is one small issue in this
assumption. If Freewave is used for web-browsing rather than
normal speaking, then the frequency and timing of calls may
be an indicator of the systems use (if it different from normal
usage patterns of users). The call frequency and use pattern
for a user who is actually using the service for web browsing
rather than calling could be substantially different to that of
the user before they started browsing, or before the started
using the service for browsing.
B. Decentralised Routing over Social Networks
Fully distributed anonymous routing precludes the use of
design options such as onion routing or its semi-centralised
peer-to-peer variants. This is due to their dependency on the
availability of a central directory service. Even with a fully
distributed directory service, we cannot make conventional
onion routing work due to the capacity constraints of each
node; deploying such a directory service would almost cer-
tainly exhaust the meagre network bandwidth available leaving
little opportunity for efficient anonymous communication.
Significant prior art exists on decentralised routing protocols
in the context of peer-to-peer adhoc networks.
Gonzalez et al. [20] proposed routing algorithms that lever-
aged human mobility patterns. Their algorithm was design to
handle edges which were available according to an exponential
distribution. These findings support those made earlier by
Clauset and Eagle [7] on a smaller dataset of 66 individuals.
Chaintreau [6] observed that in graph topologies based on
human mobility paths of O(log n) hops exist. These findings
are strongly reminiscent of the characteristics of ‘small-world’
networks which are thought to closely resemble human social
networks [41].
We can also gain some understanding of these networks
by several attempts to construct routing protocols. One of the
early proposals [39] was epidemic routing which is essentially
flooding. Other studies [43] tested the effects of flooding on
popular datasets such as the MIT Reality mining dataset1. This
dataset consists of the mobility patterns of 100 individuals
over a nine-month period. The authors found (see Fig. 2
of [43]) that (owing to the periodicity and frequency of human
mobility) the message delivery rates were time-invariant; when
the time-to-live is between three to five days, 50-60% of the
messages were delivered on the average when all pairs of
nodes simultaneously communicate.
While epidemic routing(flooding) makes few assumptions
about graph structure, it causes congestion for well understood
reasons which ultimately results in lower message delivery
rates since the network is flooded with duplicates. For these
reasons, a number of schemes that use resources more effi-
ciently have been proposed. Spyropoulos et al. [38] produced
a routing algorithm in which nodes forward limited copies of
the data to nodes that are encountered within the network.
If a node is directly connected to the destination, it sends
to the packet. This method relies heavily on the mobility of
nodes to enable the data packets to reach their destination.
This approach requires the use of a decreasing copy count. The
copy count would leak a large amount of information about the
1http://reality.media.mit.edu/dataset.php
source of the message (a node on the path knows how far the
source is from them in hops). The lack of mobility also vastly
reduces the effectiveness of the algorithm in a static network.
Daly and Haar [8] proposed using a centralised path discovery
technique to find viable shortest paths. This involves using
an O(n2logn) algorithm to find and route through the most
betweenness-central nodes in a graph, using Freeman’s [16]
definition of betweenness centrality. The authors showed that
their scheme performs almost as well as the basic flooding
algorithm. Hui et al. [24] found that betweenness centrality
and degree centrality are highly correlated and therefore using
a local centrality metric to drive route selection can also
result in performance (delivery ratios) close to that achieved
by flooding. Both of these systems are unsuitable in this
system, however, as they both require knowledge of both the
destination and the betweenness of nodes with relation to it.
This information would break unlinkability.
Mittal et al. [29] propose X-Vine, a system for providing
defence against Sybil attacks on distributed-hash table based
systems. The proposed design applies a social network overlay
to the distributed hash table (based upon Chord). The Chord
routing algorithm is used as normal at a high, but rather than
route directly between Chord points, data is routed through
a subsection of the social network. The paper has a goal
of low control data overhead, but it is still far above an
acceptable level for our setting. While this level is suitable
for networks without the stringent bandwidth limitations of
ours, it would use up too much valuable capacity in the low-
bandwidth environment.
Blindspot has some similarities to Crowds [34]. Within
Crowds, traffic is randomly routed between members of a
crowd until one member decides to forward the message to the
server. Each member on a path does not know if the preceding
member was the originator of the traffic. The routing provided
by Blindspot also provides this property; a node is unable
to tell if a message it receives or forwards originated from
the node it pulled the message from. The major difference,
however, is that in Crowds the goal is to communicate with
a server that any node can establish a direct connection to
(enabling the traffic to reach the destination), whereas in
Blindspot a path needs to be found between the source and
destination on the underlying social graph.
VII. CONCLUSION
A. Future Work
One of the major pieces of future work will be to produce
a prototype of Blindspot and to perform a limited beta (for
example limited to the author’s department). The software will
be of the form of a browser plugin that will intercept user’s
uploads and perform the system operation automatically with
minimal user input. There is also scope for creating a version
of the software for smartphones due to their increasing use as
cameras that upload images directly to social networks. The
main goal of the prototype will be to perform a usability study
of the system in operation.
One area that needs to be explored in the future is the
issue of whether or not users who are participating in the
Blindspot (or similar) system may change their uploading
behaviour in order to support the system. While this is good
for the system’s operation, the change in behaviour may be an
indication of the systems use. Exploring whether or not users
will change their behaviour noticeably while using systems
such as Blindspot will be important for any system that aims
to achieve unobservability. Finally, currently the system design
focuses on the system being present on a single social network.
In reality, users are often members of many social networks.
The users may behave differently on different networks (a
person could well upload more images on their Flickr account
that on their Facebook account), but have overlapping social
graphs. To this end, the system design could be adapted in
such a way that the users entire social graph is used (built
from all of their social networks). This could also allow the
system to make use of cover texts other than images (including
text and video) in order to increase the network capacity.
B. Conclusion
Evident use of anonymous communication networks can
present real-world risks to the lives of users in some countries.
It can also allow a censor to wholly block anonymous commu-
nications. In this paper, we have proposed Blindspot which is
specifically designed to address the needs of protest organisers
and others. Its goals are to provide indistinguishability and
unobservability against the network infrastructure provider.
We have shown that leveraging social behaviour of users is
an attractive approach to achieve these goals. In conclusion,
our main contribution is a novel decentralised routing protocol
that provides high levels of performance, given the constraints,
while providing anonymity against a global passive adversary.
It leverages trust relationships on a social network to contain
node misbehaviour and offers some protection against insider
attacks such as blackholing.
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